Open Access Research Article

A Strategy With Master-Slave Mechanism Dominates in Spatial Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Jiawei Li*

School of Computer Science, University of Nottingham Ningbo, China

Corresponding Author

Received Date: October 23, 2019;  Published Date: October 30, 2019

Abstract

Our research shows that a Collective Strategy with Master-Slave Mechanism (CSMSM) defeats Tit-for-Tat and other well-known strategies in spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma. CSMSMs identify their kin members by means of handshaking and then they defect against non-kin strategies and play either master or slave roles in interacting with kin strategies. A mater defects and a slave cooperates in order to maximize the master’s payoff. CSMSM outperforms non-collective strategies in spatial IPD once a small cluster of CSMSMs is formed. The existence and performance of CSMSM in spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma suggests that cooperation may first appear and persist in a group of collective individuals.

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